BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO

Asociación Universitaria del
Profesorado de Didáctica de las
Ciencias Sociales

8

Diciembre de 1999



Feliz año nuevo
2000

Edita: Asociación Universitaria del Profesorado de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales.
Edición a cargo de A. Gavaldà (U. Rovira i Virgili), J. Pagès (U. Autònoma de Barcelona), A. Santisteban (U.R.V.), y C. Valls (U.A.B.).
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1. EDITORIAL

Presente y futuro de la Asociación

Con este número del Boletín se cierra un periodo de cuatro años durante los cuales el equipo que se responsabilizó de su edición ha cumplido con sus compromisos: facilitar a los asociados y a las asociadas un instrumento informativo que nos acercara a las novedades en el campo de la investigación y en el bibliográfico dos veces al año. Y, asimismo, que informase de la vida de la Asociación, en especial de sus Simposios y de otras noticias que se consideraran de interés. Con éste, hemos publicado ocho números.

Junto con los Simposios y los libros de Actas, el Boletín es el principal testimonio de la existencia de la Asociación. En nuestra opinión, ha sido, es y puede seguir siendo un instrumento útil. Sin embargo, no hemos que la mayoría de asociados colaborase en él, ni ha sido un portavoz de lo que ocurre en nuestros departamentos y en nuestros centros o en otros ámbitos en los que está presente la Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales o los problemas de su enseñanza y aprendizaje. Nos han llegado muy pocas informaciones y muy pocas noticias de lo que ocurre en las distintas universidades y de lo que hacemos o dejamos de hacer en DCS. Es cierto que hemos contado con la colaboración de las personas a quienes se la hemos solicitado pero en muy pocos casos nos han llegado informaciones no solicitadas. Agradecemos el desinterés de los compañeros y compañeras a quienes les hemos solicitado su colaboración, sea para manifestar su opinión o para dar a conocer los resultados de su investigación. Nadie nos ha negado su colaboración, fuese o no miembro de la Asociación.

Sin embargo, con este número del Boletín creemos que hemos cubierto una etapa y hemos de repensar cuál debe ser el sentido de un órgano de información de esta naturaleza y qué otras cosas hemos de hacer para fomentar el conocimiento mutuo de lo que estamos haciendo en Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales. O para dar a conocer los resultados de nuestras investigaciones.

La investigación en Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales ha crecido bastante en los últimos años. Se han leído muchas tesis doctorales y son muchos los departamentos que tienen líneas de investigación más o menos consolidadas. Pero no hay financiación suficiente ni para investigar ni para dar a conocer sus resultados. A menudo, la investigación en Didáctica es más el resultado del voluntarismo del profesorado que de políticas que prioricen este tipo de investigaciones educativas. Por otro lado, es difícil hallar editoriales que publiquen los resultados de la investigación en didáctica. Tampoco existe ninguna revista dedicada específicamente a la investigación en Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales en la que se dé salida a los trabajos que se están realizan-

do. Este es un reto importante al que la Asociación ha de intentar dar alguna salida, en colaboración con otras instituciones o asociaciones, o en solitario.

La evaluación de la investigación dejará pronto de ser un tramite voluntario de quienes quieran obtener un tramo más para incrementar su salario. Algunas Universidades ya apuestan por una evaluación de la investigación de cada departamento y en función de los resultados se van a arbitrar los presupuestos. Parece una tendencia universal. Sin duda, para la Universidad es importante evaluar la docencia y la investigación de su profesorado y de sus departamentos. También lo es para el crecimiento de la Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales. Pero para que esta valoración se haga con los mismos requisitos o criterios que el resto de áreas de conocimiento hace falta un esfuerzo más para que nuestro punto de partida no sea un obstáculo o no nos hipoteque. Y, en buena parte, este esfuerzo pasa por hallar los instrumentos que permitan dar a conocer nuestro trabajo.

El Simposio de Huelva, de abril del 2000, será un buen momento para analizar y valorar el trabajo realizado hasta la fecha. La actual Junta Directiva acabará su mandato y habrá que elegir una nueva Junta. No queremos hipotecar su futuro ni imponerle aquello que nosotros no hemos hecho.

En la Asamblea habrá que realizar un balance del trabajo hecho hasta la fecha y tomar decisiones de cara al futuro. Tenemos solucionada la continuidad de los Simposios hasta el año 2002. Creemos que vale la pena seguir manteniendo un Boletín como el que tenéis en vuestras manos. Pero también creemos que hemos de realizar un paso más. Esperamos vuestras ideas, sugerencias e iniciativas. Quienes nos hemos responsabilizado hasta ahora de la edición del Boletín seguimos dispuestos a colaborar con la nueva Junta directiva, a aportar nuestra experiencia y nuestras ideas. Pero el trabajo que se avecina requiere de la colaboración de todos y cada uno de los profesores y profesoras de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales y de la Asociación como colectivo. En ello estaremos quienes sigamos creyendo en nuestro trabajo y en la posibilidad de hacer de la Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales un referente importante en la formación del profesorado.

Buena entrada a los 2000!!!



2. El XI Simposio Internacional de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales

Modelos, contenidos y experiencias en la formación del profesorado de ciencias sociales

Universidad de Huelva, 11 al 14 de abril del 2000

Martes, 11 de abril

9'30 h. Recepción y entrega de documentación.

10'00 h. Inauguración del XI Simposio de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales.

10'30 h. Ponencia: Modelos y estrategias en la formación del profesorado de Ciencias Sociales.
Ponente: Beverly J. Armento.
Georgia State University of Atlanta (Estados Unidos).

12'00 h. Descanso y café.

12'30 h. Comunicaciones.

14'00 h. Visita y Recepción en el Parque Temático Muelle de las Carabelas (Exc. Diputación Provincial de Huelva).

16'30 h. Visita Monasterio de La Rábida.

18'00 h. Mesa Redonda. Propuestas y perspectivas en la formación del profesorado de Didáctica de las CCSS.
Lugar: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía. Sede La Rábida.
Participantes: Ivo Matozzi.
Universidad de Bolonia (Italia).
Silvia Finoccio. Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina).
Montserrat Casas. Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (España).

21'00 h. Bufete de Acogida

Miércoles, 12 de abril

9,30 h. Ponencia. El conocimiento profesional del profesorado de Ciencias Sociales
Ponente: Jesús Estepa.
Universidad de Huelva.

11h. Descanso.

11,30h. Comunicaciones.

14 h. Comida

15 h. Visita al Parque Nacional de Doñana.

Jueves, 13 de abril

9,30 h. Ponencia. Metodología en la enseñanza de la DCS: teoría y práctica.
Ponente: Isidoro González.
Universidad de Valladolid.

11 h. Descanso

11,30 h. Comunicaciones. Experiencias de formación inicial y permanente del profesorado de Educación Infantil, Primaria y Secundaria.

16,30 h. Asamblea de la Asociación
21 h. Cena y despedida.

Viernes, 14 de abril

10 h. Visita a la Sierra de Huelva: Aracena y Jabugo.

PRESENTACIÓN DE COMUNICACIONES

Los asistentes al Simposio podrán presentar comunicaciones en relación con la temática de las ponencias.
Deberá remitirse por triplicado mecanografiado a doble espacio y en papel DIN-A4, a una sola cara; su extensión no deberá exceder de 40.000 caracteres (15 folios) incluyendo gráficos, resumen, bibliografía y anexos. Se adjuntará asimismo un disquete en procesador de texto PC compatible programas Wp o Word. Deberá acompañarse de un resumen de 5 a 10 líneas mecanografiadas, así como el título de la comunicación, autor(es), centro habitual de trabajo, dirección de contacto, teléfono y e-mail.
El comité científico del simposio, en función de la calidad de los trabajos presentados, se reserva el derecho de publicar dichas comunicaciones en las Actas del Simposio o de entregar fotocopias de las mismas a los participantes.
El plazo de admisión de comunicaciones finalizará el 10 de enero del 2000. No se admitirán comunicaciones sin inscripción.

Inscripciones
Cumplimentar y enviar el boletín de inscripción a la coordinación del simposio, junto con una copia del resguardo del ingreso o transferencia bancaria, del importe de la cuota correspondiente.
El ingreso debe realizarse a nombre de:
XI Simposio de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales,
Número de cuenta
2098-0092-42-010-2000038, El Monte, Caja de Ahorros de Huelva y Sevilla.
Cuota ordinaria: 22.000 ptas.
Miembros de la Asociación: 12.000 ptas
Estudiantes: 5.000 ptas.
El plazo de inscripción se abre el día 1 de enero del 2000. Las cuotas se incrementarán en 3.000 ptas para aquellas inscripciones recibidas después del 15 de marzo del 2000.

Comité Científico
Mercedes de la Calle Carracedo EU de Educación de Palencia. U.Valladolid.
Antonia Fernández Valencia. U. Complutense de Madrid.
Antonia Mª Filella Pujol. U. Lleida.
Teresa García Santa María. U. La Rioja
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Antoni Santisteban Fernández. URV.
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Departamento de Didáctica de las Ciencias y Filosofía.
Universidad de Huelva.
Asociación Universitaria de Profesores de Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales

Colaboran
Vicerrectorado de Investigación UHU.
Vicerrectorado de Extensión Univ. UHU.
Facultad de Ciencias de la Educación. Decanato. UHU.
Universidad Internacional de Andalucía. Sede de La Rábida.
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura.
Consejería de Educación y Ciencia. Junta de Andalucía.
Diputación Provincial de Huelva.
Ayuntamiento de Huelva.
Fundación El Monte.

XI SIMPOSIO INTERNACIONAL DE DIDÁCTICA DE LAS CIENCIAS SOCIALES

BOLETÍN DE INSCRIPCIÓN

Apellidos:_____

Nombre:_____

Dirección:_____

C.P.:_____ Población:_____

Teléfono:_____ Fax:_____ e-mail:_____

Presenta comunicación:_____ Título comunicación_____

Dirección profesional:_____

Centro:_____

_____

Modalidad de inscripción:

Ordinaria:___ Miembro de la Asociación:___ Estudiante:___

Desea realizar la visita al P. N. Doñana: Si___ No___

Está interesado en asistir a la cena de clausura: Si___ No___

Desea realizar la visita a la Sierra de Huelva (Aracena-Jabugo): Si___ No___

3. ARTÍCULOS DE FONDO

Por su interés reproducimos los tres artículos siguientes:
* AAVV (1999): "Great Books of the Twentieth Century and Their Influence on Social Studies Education". *The Social Studies*, Vol.90, núm.1, 5-17.
* Guarnieri, G. (1999): "Rapporti humani ed insegnamento della storia dell'arte". *Scuola e città*. Anno 50, núm. 5/6, 184-191.
* Bowles, R. (1999): "Research in UK Primary Geography". *International Research in Geographical and Environmental Education*, Vol.8, núm.1, 59-65.

Great Books of the Twentieth Century and Their Influence on Social Studies Education

As the new millennium approaches, educators often look back as well as forward. Many articles will be written about our future together. But what of our past? The editors of *The Social Studies* invited respected scholars in our field to consider this question: "The twentieth century was a century for book publication. Now, as this century comes to a close, which of those many books had, or should have had, the greatest impact on social education in North America?"

RODNEY F. ALLEN
Co-Executive Editor
The Social Studies

CONTRIBUTORS AND THEIR BOOK SELECTIONS

LEE F. ANDERSON—*The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community,* by William McNeill. (University of Chicago Press, 1963)
O. L. DAVIS, JR.—*Experience and Education,* by John Dewey. (Macmillan, 1938)
WILMA S. LONGSTREET—*Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, by Marshall McLuhan. (McGraw-Hill, 1964)
JOHN PAUL LUNSTRUM—*Teaching High School Social Studies,* by Maurice P. Hunt and Lawrence E. Metcalf. (Harper, 1955)
HOWARD D. MEHLINGER—*The Process of Education,* by Jerome S. Bruner. (Harvard University Press, 1960)
JACK L. NELSON—*How We Think,* by John Dewey. (2nd Edition, D. C. Heath, 1933)
JAMES P. SHAVER—*An American Dilemma.* by Gunnar Myrdal. (Harper, 1955)
WILLIAM B. STANLEY—*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* by Thomas Kuhn. (University of Chicago Press, 1962)

The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community

I do not claim that William McNeill's *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (University of Chicago Press, 1963) has influenced social studies more than any other book published in the last century. In fact, I do not know if one singular "most influential book" exists, and if it does, I do not know how to go about discovering that book. In choosing *The Rise of the West*, I sought a good book whose publication immediately and noticeably influenced a significant domain of social studies and at the same time addressed an enduring issue in social education, so that its influence is likely to survive the forthcoming transition to a new century and millennium. *The Rise of the West* clearly meets these criteria.

The Rise of the West is undisputably a good book. It is a lengthy, carefully reasoned, and finely crafted world history. The book is the fruit of a decade of labor (1954–1963) on the part of one of the world's most respected and intellectually innovative historians. When published in 1963, *The Rise of the West* met

with immediate acclaim. Hugh Trevor-Roper praised it extensively in the *New York Times Book Review*. It was on the best seller list for a time and received the National Book Award in History and Biography.

Apart from the quality of the book's scholarship, *The Rise of the West* is a good book both for what it succeeds in doing and because of its weaknesses. McNeill set out to provide an alternative to prevailing world histories, which are unambiguously Eurocentric, and to tell the story of humanity in a more cosmopolitan context and from a more global perspective. The work is not entirely successful in this respect, as McNeill himself was the first to acknowledge. Although the book does much to escape from the gravitational hold of Eurocentrism, Africa and its place in the hemispheric history of the Afro-Eurasian supercontinent are neglected, and the other regional centers of human history—the Americas, Australia, and Oceania—are accorded scant attention prior to the modern period in world history. The book's underlying logic points to those gaps as intellectual challenges for another generation of historians and educators to take up with the same rigor and imagination that McNeill displays in *The Rise of the West*.

For several years preceding the publication of *The Rise of the West*, world history was in deep trouble as both a field of scholarship and a domain of education. Many professional historians looked on world history as an embarrassment in the age of specialized historiography. College survey courses in world history were rapidly disappearing, or if they survived, they often did so as misnomers for courses in European history, with the rest of the world tacked on as marginal additions. At the secondary level of American education, world history was also in a state of deep malaise. In the late 1940s, a National Council for the Social Studies president declared world history to be the "sick man of the curriculum." Student enrollments were decent because a class in world history and one in American history were commonly required social studies courses in most states. Beyond enrollments, little else about world history was in good health. A series of reports spanning a couple of decades told a tale of widespread discontent on the part of students and teachers as well as professional historians and educators. By the 1970s, world history seemed to be well down the road to extinction in both schools and colleges.

Today the story is quite different. Few observers would diagnose world history as in a state of perfect health, but even fewer would place world history on a list of endangered academic species. This turn about is attributable in no small measure to *The Rise of the West*, or more accurately, to the book plus its author. McNeill and the intellectual vision he articulated have been called the Marshall Plan of world history. Writing in the mid-1980s, one of the leaders in the revitalization of world history noted: "No one would have any difficulty in explaining the rise of world history as a movement and a field of study. It is due to William McNeill."

Probably the major social mechanism connecting McNeill's mind and vision to researchers in university libraries and to educators in college and school classrooms is the World History Association (WHA). Established in the 1980s, about the time McNeill retired from the University of Chicago, the WHA has served to link older and younger scholars in the history profession and beyond. Its respected and very readable journal, *Journal of World History*, has restored a great deal of credibility to world history as a field of scholarship and has accorded a good deal of visibility to the idea of world history as the global history of humankind.

Also the WHA has done much to infuse a new vitality into the teaching of world history in our schools and colleges. More than any other academic organization I know of, the WHA has succeeded in bridging the worlds of secondary and higher education. Organizational leaders as well as members of the association are recruited from both worlds, and within the association high school and college members more than simply occupy a common organizational space, they share a common intellectual culture ground in the ongoing intellectual and political challenges of building and teaching global history.

Clearly McNeill and his magnum opus, *The Rise of the West*, have left a very visible imprint on contemporary social education. However, McNeill's influence extends in intellectual space beyond the realm of world history per se, and in all likelihood his influence will extend in time beyond the close of this century and millennium. That is the case because McNeill focused on the challenge that is fundamental to those aspects of historical and social science scholarship and social education that will endure well into the next century. The challenge is to craft a social science scholarship and a social education congruent with and responsive to that cluster of related changes in the world that we have come to call globalization, that is, the historical processes giving rise to a planet with a global history, a global geography, and a global sociology.

It is no coincidence that this challenge has emerged and intensified in the closing century of the current millennium. In the long-term historical perspective, the second millennium A.D. appears to be very much a transitional era in the chronology of humanity. During this millennium, a ten-thousand-year epoch that began with the Pleistocene/Halocence transition ended, and a new and different historical period emerged. In the epoch that ended, the world's social and ecological structure was characterized by a high degree of regional isolation. Once populated by colonists from the Asian side of the Old World, the three New Worlds of Australia, the Americas, and Oceania developed largely in ecological and cultural isolation from one another and from their Afro-Eurasian homeland. The mutual isolation and independence of the regions was progressively bridged in the centuries following 1000 A.D. The ever-expanding network of increasingly dense regional connections in due course gave rise to new global systems that now gird the planet as the second millennium comes to an end. The new global systems include most obviously worldwide transportation and commu-

nication networks, the global economy, the global polity with its emerging civic society and institutions of transnational governance, and the growing array of global cultures in such areas as science, religion, music, sports, entertainment, and cuisines.

The transition from a time of regional history to an age of global history is not yet complete, but this movement has definitely progressed to such a point that we can usefully label the millennium that is ending the Globalizing Age or Age of Globalization. It is not surprising that scholars and educators living in the waning decades of this millennium are scrambling to make intellectual sense of the geography, history, and sociology of the global age that is rapidly emerging around us. The currently developing global historiography, social science, and education are the work of many scholars and educators in a wide variety of academic disciplines, but most will salute the pioneering effort of William McNeill.

LEE F. ANDERSON
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Experience and Education

John Dewey's *Experience and Education* was a classic by the time that I first encountered it in a bibliography for one of my first teacher preparation courses; I vividly remember it. I also recall that I did not read the slim volume at the time, but waited until several years later. Then I did not just read the book; I engaged it. Having reread this book on a number of occasions, I continue to engage it.

During my readings of the book, I have not focused on Dewey's development of principles or on the possible contradictions in his general philosophy. My interest has been less in learning more about Dewey's ideas than in something else: I have found that I think *with* Dewey's ideas; I do not just *accept* his conclusions. I challenge them, wrestle with them, reject some, and grasp others. My engagements with the book prompt me to think anew about my own positions and practices. The book opens me to surprise.

The book offers me the means by which I continue to understand progressivism in American education. Indeed, Dewey wrote this essay mainly to object to the mutant and often bizarre variations that embarrassed and surely threatened the vitality of progressive education, its visions and practices. He succeeded only partially. He raised several of the right intellectual issues and pointed Americans in more productive directions. However, the anomalies to which he objected continued to grow. I suspect that no one, certainly not this quiet, mild philosopher, could have diverted or subdued the progressive ideologues of the period. As with most self-proclaimed revolutionaries, their zeal substituted for intelligence.

Dewey's first and continuing concern in this book was the vexing rhetorical claim of either–or thinking. In that form of argument, the ground rules are clear: Advocacy defines its opposition, no middle ground exists, and the winner, like Napoleon, crowns himself. To Dewey, the acknowledged father of progressive education, the progressive versus traditional dispute of the mid-1930s was less than clear. He was aware that characteristic practices of the positions continued to be ambiguous. Furthermore, he recognized that the strident, hard-line supporters of progressivism and traditionalism confused principles and purportedly related practices. Especially, in many progressives' zeal to overcome their perceptions of the rigidity of traditional classroom organization and teaching-learning engagements, they sought to hoist the standards of the New Education on the battlements with mainly symbolic regard rather than conscious concern about the nature of experience. In this either-or thinking, Dewey recognized a seriously troubled progressive education. Prominent defects included superficiality of studies, abandonment of the wisdom of maturity and of disciplined inquiry, and even the loss of freedom. Under the slogan of experience, Dewey believed that progressive education advocates had not examined critically the meanings (principles) and practices related to the nature of experience. As a necessary corrective, Dewey considered several important matters as a kind of agenda for discovery, not a clarion of advocacy.

Dewey presented those ideas in the 1938 biannual lecture of Kappa Delta Pi, the nation's premier scholastic honor society in education. In a different venue, a meeting of the nation's school superintendents, for example, his analysis and proposals might have attracted more attention. His published lecture (reprinted many times) enjoyed only a small initial printing. Even so, Dewey's essay likely dismayed many progressivist ideologues of the day and has probably affected several generations of education students. *Experience and Education,* to most people, seems unlike Dewey, an aberration of the progressive myth of "love students and watch them grow."

I believe this attribute constitutes a central element of the volume's continuing significance. Dewey focused his and our attention on basic concerns. He was discontented with empty slogans that masqueraded as profound witness. He considered individual human beings and substantive knowledge very seriously. Dewey held that the nature and quality of individuals' experiences related intimately to their education. However, he argued that this nature and quality did not simply exist. He insisted that educators commit their intelligence to understanding the complexity and ambiguity of individual experience and to inventing practical educational possibilities to enhance that experience.

Such tasks are not the gruel of impoverished, unreflective student assignments nor of classroom activities legitimated as being fun. They are not the wholesale substitution of immature interest for the wisdom of organized knowledge and the reflection of mature, mindful adults. They are not the politi-

cally expedient imposition of arbitrary achievement standards and the requirement of high-stakes examinations. Moreover, they ordinarily do not respond to off-the-shelf patent remedies. These tasks, however, are necessary responses to practical realities. They require individuals, not solely teachers but also parents and students, to apply their intelligence.

Dewey's positions demand minds-on attention. Perhaps his in-your-face dissent to lazy thinking and slogan-laced legitimation of educational practices helps explain much public reaction to the book. His call to deal directly with the fullness of experience constitutes a tough demand. For example, it includes attention to at least two critical matters: students' rich personal involvement with their current experience and their fulsome engagement with the conventional subject matters of schooling. Dewey's demanding concern for experience likely includes too much for essentialist and progressive educators of both his era and ours. It remains too demanding for the tinkerers toward reform and the hucksters of instant solutions and those who would engineer a restoration of an imagined past.

I have found increased personal meaning in Dewey's ideas as I have sought to understand the history of the curriculum and to develop improved practical school programs. Several specific examples from the social studies illustrate my progress.

Curriculum reality sharply differs from curriculum rhetoric. American schools, for instance, never incorporated the strident and exaggerated claims for a unified social studies that did not include special attention to the separate social subjects. Student study of contemporary social problems never overwhelmed most conventional offerings and topics. The school subjects of history and geography, for example, are not dead. In addition, their practical status in the curriculum was never seriously endangered, regardless of the posturing claims and the contentious rhetoric of the past half-century.

On the other hand, efforts over the years generally failed to include serious curriculum attention to significant social concerns. Issues of peace and war, to name just one set, ordinarily remain homeless in the American social studies curriculum. Students continue to name social studies courses as those least liked. History courses, dominated by increasingly thicker textbooks, mostly remain lifeless, absent students' engagement in thinking with original sources.

Had American social studies educators taken Dewey's ideas seriously sixty years ago, the current situation might be different. Clearly, "might" expresses only hesitant possibility. Consideration of a few of the might-have-beens, however, can embolden the prospects of an enhanced social studies for the new century.

One of those might-have-beens is some curricular time and resources to focus on significant social problems within conventional courses. Urging the use of time in this manner does not argue for the substitution, for example, of the study of social problems for the disciplined study of history or for the neglect of geography. Such a period of time would make possible the construction of rigorous, mindful studies of truly significant issues. The amount of such time is negotiable—more time in some weeks, semesters, and years, and less time in others. This kind of attention well might have avoided the thankfully short-lived, postwar tolerance of vacuous instructional units on "the use of the telephone" or "boy-girl relationships" in a few highly visible social studies offerings. "Some" time, in line with Dewey's warning against either-or thinking, does not solve the problem; it only enables teachers and others, even with some student participation, thoughtfully to develop serious options.

Another possible development could have been earlier and more deliberate attention to students' richer engagement in the several social subjects. From the appearance of Dewey's essay, nearly thirty years elapsed before the 1960s national curriculum projects emphasized students' serious fieldwork (not just field trips), their use of original sources, and their involvement in subject-specific thinking. After a brief flash of excitement, even those notions dissipated, only recently to reappear in different forms. Why could these practical innovations not have occurred earlier and more regularly? These pedagogic practices, certainly, were commonplace in many schools at the beginning of the twentieth century. Why, even now, does apathy to their prospects flourish? How can the energy of opposition be transformed into real commitment to invent opportunities for students to enjoy the heady experience of fruitful inquiry within the social subjects?

Possibly, only possibly, tough-minded, practical attention to Dewey's ideas might have helped American education, including the social studies, avoid at least some of the savage criticism lavished on our schools during the past half-century. American schools, including social studies classes, have never been as bad and empty-minded as their harshest critics have portrayed them to be. Admittedly, this schooling has not been as robust as it should have been. Schools must become better.

Dewey's insistence that the nature of experience be considered directly has not been persuasive. Regrettably, American educators have avoided this idea too often during this century. This consequence is more than an unsightly blemish on American education. It represents continuing allegiance to unproductive either–or political advocacies. It frustrates, if not strangles, meaningful deliberations about substantive educational reform.

Americans deserve better than they have received from their commitment to schooling in a democracy. On this point, most Americans find common ground. As to a next step beyond that agreement, I offer a modest suggestion. Dewey's advice about experience remains sound. It is neither a recipe nor a road map. It is a compass for our creation of schools to match our visions. I recommend that we take Dewey's book with us as we venture into the new millennium.

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Marshall McLuhan: Futurist Extraordinaire

Marshall McLuhan was one of the most original thinkers of the twentieth century, but he was viewed by the more serious critics of his day as a maverick given to espousing extremist positions, often with insufficient evidence to sustain them. In the words of one such critic,

> A single page [of Understanding Media] is impressive, two are "stimulating," five raise serious doubts, ten confirm them, and long before the hardy reader has staggered to page 359 the accumulation of contradictions, non-sequiturs, facts that are distorted and facts that are not facts, exaggerations, and chronic rhetorical vagueness has numbed him to the insights...and the many bits of new and fascinating information.... (Macdonald 1969, 32)

Notwithstanding the expansiveness and frequent overstatement of his theoretical positions, his convoluted sentence structure, and the diffused organization of his writing, McLuhan's theses regarding the impact of technology on perception and intellectual development and, ultimately, on the very nature of society both in the present and past provide a unique historical perspective from which to examine our likely futures. The pity is that in the thirty-five or so years since his major works appeared, little empirical research has been undertaken to explore McLuhan's quite original views about the role technology plays in the development of human understanding and knowledge. It would appear that the technical inadequacies of his publications have blinded research scholars to McLuhan's genuine insights, which, if they were to be sustained by empirical investigations, would establish a new frame of reference for examining the role of the media and their functioning in cultural development. Decades have passed, McLuhan has been more or less ignored, and the substantial impact of the media on how we think and on how we behave as citizens is as poorly understood as ever.

In *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (1962), McLuhan wrote about a prehistoric time of aural domination—a kind of paradise in which knowledge of our humanness was limited by the spoken word and our pre-alphabetic condition. It was a period of a holistic and spiritually idealistic conception of life. The development of the written word, a phonetic and visual form of communication and a significant technological advancement, enabled an enormous increase in the transmission of knowledge from generation to generation by way of inscription and manuscripts. That led not only to a seemingly biblical self-awareness as was initiated by Eve as she ate from the forbidden apple but to a new way of perceiving society and its world. The linear and sequential arrangement of written words established a cultural frame of mind that mimicked the linearity and sequential orderliness of visual communication. Until the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg in 1464, a balance existed between aural and visual representations of knowledge. The printing press led to visual dominance through its capacity to replicate with uniformity and in large quantity, essentially transforming the visual medium from singular linearity to the capability for mass reproduction of logically organized generalizations, from simple cause and effect to complex rationalism and mathematical order directed toward mechanical invention and science.

Had McLuhan ended his discussion of the print medium with his numerous, often brilliant, examples from history and literature, this article reminding us of his pivotal importance for understanding contemporary conditions would probably be unnecessary. Indeed, we might now be exploring how the dramatic change in the print medium from an essentially static state to a dynamic one has affected our cultural images and ways of knowing. Print no longer just sits on a page. Computer monitors and television can make text explode and implode, dance and wiggle, increase or decrease in size, cross t's and roll dots as though the letters were literally alive. Typically, dynamic text delivers short messages rather than extended discourses. What impact might dynamic text have on the participatory processes assumed essential to the functioning of a democracy? Would knowledge itself be perceived as a series of dynamic processes, as Dewey suggested a century ago and as progressive educators would have us do today? Instead of pursuing questions such as these, we continue our Enlightenment devotion to reading books.

It was this devotion that sidetracked many of McLuhan's critics into a defense of reading and the value of books. McLuhan had continued his discussion of the printing press by depicting it as a catastrophe leading to many of the world's woes from industrialism and specialization to capitalism and secularism. Although one may dismiss McLuhan's views of the print medium as a major source of the Western world's array of catastrophes, it is quite another case to ignore the thesis that the very use of the print medium affects the way human beings understand their world and interact with each other. In proposing this thesis, McLuhan did not stand alone. He unified the work of several fields in his efforts to describe the influence of the print medium. From sociolinguistics and anthropology, he extended the development of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posited that language influences the structure of thought as well as the individual's perceptions of reality, and integrated it with communication media. He was also well versed in the power of image making, a concept of great importance to the world of literature, in which he was an expert. Images were derived not only from the meanings conveyed but from the very nature of the conveyor, that is, the medium. The separation of sensory and social organization, typically made by virtue of the way fields of study are organized, was essentially set aside by McLuhan so that the senses, the media, the images of reality, and the nature of thought could be brought together in an interactive whole.

Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man was published in 1964 and was both a continuation of and contrast to

The Gutenberg Galaxy. The earlier work is dominated by examples from the past and by a discouraging sense of what the print medium has cost civilization. The later work involves McLuhan's own present and future and his faith in "the ultimate harmony of being." The tone is more positive, but the tendency to make excessive claims persists.

In *Understanding Media*, McLuhan theorized that media are simply extensions of human organs—a hammer extends the force of the fist, a magnifying glass extends the visual capacity of the eye, and so forth. Tools and media are treated conceptually as one and the same. Technological extensions undermine the balance among the body's faculties by increasing the power of one over the others, thus changing the way the faculties function together. The individual is hardly aware of what is happening. The electronic extensions of human senses are especially significant because the development and balance of the human nervous system is involved. McLuhan saw the future as deeply committed to the new electronic technologies, and he readily embraced them, pointing out that the dominance of the print medium in Western culture is nearly over.

Certainly, the theory proposed would require careful investigation rather than oblivion. Why isn't Johnny reading anymore? Is there a "nervous system" connection between the electronic media and the decline in people's proclivity for reading? Before young children go to school, they watch television from about five to eight hours a day. Most of us are concerned with the content of the programming that children watch—the violence and murders they may witness while eating ice cream cones; the elegance of wealthy homes that they are led to believe belong to average people while their own homes are relatively small and drab; the resolution of difficult problems, even socially difficult ones, in an hour or less while their parents may be in the midst of divorce, bankruptcy, or some other problem defying solution. Much in the content of television needs to be confronted.

However, if McLuhan's description of electronic media as potential extensions of the human nervous system approximates reality, then a far more insidious phenomenon may be occurring largely without our awareness. The extended watching of television by preschool children may be creating an imbalance of faculties that interferes with the development of reading skills, and even with the development of logical, analytical skills. Video presentations are divided into brief sections interrupted by numerous short but highly stimulating commercials and the ubiquitous changing of channels. How this constant switching from one brief experience to another affects intellectual development remains an unknown. Furthermore, the video medium presents holistic packages of integrated information quite differently from the print medium. What influence that may have on the ways we perceive our world and organize our knowledge remains equally unknown.

McLuhan has put forth an extraordinary set of ideas, but after thirty-five years, they remain uninvestigated and largely overlooked. The field of social studies has certainly shown little interest in exploring the relationship of the electronic media to the development of democratic citizenship. Despite widespread recognition that television has changed the election process and the ways citizens are involved in the events of the day, video literacy is typically not a part of the social studies curriculum. Social studies research often explores the development of critical thinking skills but rarely in terms of the potential relationship of those skills to the electronic media. The rise in crime and violence that has characterized the last decades of the twentieth century has often been related to the content of television and the viewing habits of children, but exactly how television develops criminality in children remains virtually unexplored. Despite the deterministic quality of much of McLuhan's writing, the exploration of his ideas in depth could contribute substantially to better control, both individual and societal, over what may be characterized as our runaway electronic media. The field of social studies certainly should share in that exploration.

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Teaching High School Social Studies

When a colleague recently inquired what book I would consider a great book in its impact on the profession and the classroom practitioner, I had to reflect only briefly. I responded without much hesitation: Hunt and Metcalf's 1955 edition of *Teaching High School Social Studies*. It may seem odd to nominate a textbook on methods of teaching, but I believe a strong case can be made for the Hunt and Metcalf work.

First, this book stood in clear contrast to most methods texts of the period, which usually contained boring, pious pronouncements of John Dewey, with a hortatory summons to build good citizens. More often than not, those textbooks also offered what might be called a cookbook approach to teaching; for example, the widely used and popular Edgar Wesley (1937) textbook consisted of list after list of admonitions and practices for beginning teachers, without a central intellectual foundation. By way of sharp contrast, the Hunt and Metcalf text was a bold, compelling but scholarly assault on the conventional wisdom of a time when social studies teachers

were intimidated by the forces of McCarthyism, the irrational fears of Communism sparking investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the pronouncements of many self-appointed community vigilantes.

Second, Hunt and Metcalf grounded their textbook on a careful examination of learning theories reinforced by a searching analysis of American culture of the 1950s. In calling for an examination of areas closed to rational inquiry, their textbook paved the way for an inquiry movement and proposals for a more systematic treatment of public issues. Moreover, the authors made it clear that a social studies teacher could effectively and safely subvert the conventional 'social studies program by covering whatever ground was necessary to reassure administrators and supervisors and still provide students with an opportunity to reflect in a thoughtful way on the significant, enduring issues of society by using springboards. "A teacher," explained Hunt and Metcalf, "can help students acquire memorized associations or he can help students delve more deeply into the meaning of textbook content." How to accomplish the latter is then set forth with useful examples of "jumping off places" or springboards to reflection.

I suspect that my earlier experiences as a beginning teacher helped me to grasp the significance of what Hunt and Metcalf were saying. In 1949, after surviving my first year of teaching, I traveled with a friend to Mexico City where we enrolled in the summer school of the National University of Mexico. While taking classes there in Latin American history, I learned for the first time from a passionate and able professor the Mexican point of view about the origin of the Mexican-American War.

When I returned home, beginning my second year of teaching, I struggled to find ways to engage my students in a thoughtful examination of American history. It was not easy with a bland, sterile text. My struggle came to a head one Friday afternoon when I observed about half of my class drifting off to sleep as we worked our way through a recitation of the war with Mexico. Acting on an impulse, I stopped the recitation and told my students that there was another version of the war, and together we read the Mexican account. From those who were still awake, there were loud objections to and questions about the Mexican account. The whole class suddenly became alert: it was what I later learned would be called a "teachable moment." That led to a discussion about the nature of history and how perspective can be shaped by culture. After that experience, my class and I read and studied our textbook critically, searching for meaning and clarity.

Hunt and Metcalf were not visionaries or do-gooders without a stout anchor to the real classroom world of teachers. Their text was filled with practical advice about how to extend academic freedom and how to build a classroom climate supportive of reflective thinking. There were cautionary notes, some of which bear repeating in this era when teachers and social studies educators may view themselves as curriculum evangelists or apostles of a new movement, whether called multicultural education, global education, or population education. "Objective teachers," wrote Hunt and Metcalf in their 1955 edition, "are not social reformers, do gooders or welfare statesmen but neither are they standpatters, diehards or backers of normalcy. They are not committed to change for the sake of change but neither are they committed to the perpetuation of everything as it is. They instigate reflection and let the chips fall where they may" (146).

Perhaps a personal narrative concerning my encounter with the Hunt and Metcalf 1955 edition would serve to drive home these points. I took a course in the summer of 1956 at Indiana State College (now University) and reluctantly signed up for a methods course. Up to this point, I had assiduously avoided as many education and methods courses as possible. To my pleasant surprise, the instructor—newly arrived at Indiana State—was an experienced classroom teacher, a stimulating college instructor with a Ph.D. in political science. I learned much that summer about the nature of learning and the constructive role of controversy from Will Engelland and from our analysis of the Hunt and Metcalf text.

Before that encounter, I had been sensitized to what Hunt and Metcalf would have called an "unrecognized cultural conflict." It was announced one day in my high school that all social studies classes would visit Indianapolis to view the proceedings of the State Legislature. It was called "democracy in action." I was disturbed, however, when I learned from my department head that instead of dining in a good restaurant with my students, I would have to carry a brown bag lunch. The department head reminded me that one of my ablest students, the African American lad John W., could not eat with us because of the segregation policy of Indianapolis restaurants—this in the enlightened era of the early 1950s when we were about to see democracy in action! The contradiction struck me vividly.

John and I found our way to Union Station, sat on a bench, ate our lunches, and discussed the situation. The upshot was that I invited John's father, a minister, to discuss with my class his views on civil rights. Fortunately, this came at a time when we were studying the Reconstruction period in American history, and so without knowing it, I had stumbled on the use of a springboard. The appearance of an African American minister was a catalyst to a heated discussion about the Reconstruction period and led one student, Ray C., to volunteer to introduce the Klan point of view. Alas, I handled that poorly, rejecting Ray's offer and lecturing the class on the evils of the Ku Klux Klan. I had failed to build a climate to facilitate open-mindedness and simply reinforced prevailing beliefs in the class. As Hunt and Metcalf had pointed out, "a student feels a threat to his ego if he regards his beliefs as under fire." The authors reminded teachers of one rule: Treat student opinions with respect without necessarily expressing approval.

Another important contribution by Hunt and Metcalf was to make the Deweyan perspective meaningful to social studies teachers. Many, like me,

had endured in education courses the many pronouncements of Dewey as interpreted by his zealous and often uncritical followers without comprehending the relevance to a social studies classroom. Not only is the thinking of Dewey evident in this textbook, but also the influence of other recognized scholars including Gordon Hullfish (1911), Boyd Bode (1939) and Alan Griffin (1940).

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The Process of Education

Almost forty years ago, in September 1959, thirty-four scientists, scholars, and educators met for ten days at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, to discuss ways to improve science education in American primary and secondary schools. The meeting was called by the National Academy of Sciences, which had been exploring ways to strengthen the content and methods of science instruction. Those who attended the meeting included mathematicians, physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, historians, educationists, and cinematographers.

After the close of the meeting, Jerome S. Bruner, conference chairman and a Harvard psychologist, wrote a chairman's report that provided an account of the conference's major themes and tentative conclusions. His report, published as a book called *The Process of Education*, became the bible of the curriculum reform movement of the 1960s. It was probably the most quoted educational book in the 1960s, even by those who had not read it.

The book was organized around five topics: the structure of disciplines, readiness to learn, cultivation of intuition, motivation for learning, and the role of media in instruction. Bruner's comments on the first two topics—structure of disciplines and readiness to learn—greatly influenced the work of curriculum developers and educators generally throughout the decade of the 1960s. Misinterpretations of his ideas about the cultivation of intuition were also influential. His thoughts on motivation for learning and the role of media in instruction were interesting but less influential. I focus here on the three topics on which his influence was greatest.

Three Influential Topics

Structure of a Discipline

A main concern of the Woods Hole conferees was finding ways to design instruction to ensure more successful knowledge retention and knowledge transfer by K-12 students. The conferees were concerned that many students quickly forgot the material covered in their classes and were unable to apply lessons they had learned. Bruner believed that schools devoted too much time to having students memorize isolated bits of data that were easily forgotten. He thought that knowledge retention could be greatly enhanced if instruction were organized around the structure of an academic discipline.

By "structure of a discipline," Bruner meant focusing on the key concepts and organizing principles that represent the essential core of an academic field of study. Once a student had grasped that essential core, he or she could easily relate new information to it. Bruner admired academic specialists who were able to think powerfully about their disciplines and see relationships that others missed. By learning the structure of a discipline, students could begin to think like academic scholars.

Readiness to Learn

Bruner also believed that children were capable of mastering academic content much earlier than was typically assumed by American educators. As a psychologist, he was familiar with theories of cognitive development, but he argued that

> the intellectual development of the child is no clockwork sequence of events: it also responds to influences from the environment, notably the school environment. Thus, instruction in scientific ideas, even at the elementary level, need not follow slavishly the natural course of cognitive development in the child. It can also lead intellectual development by providing challenging but usable opportunities for the child to forge ahead in his development. (39)

Bruner's notion of readiness to learn was linked to his ideas about the importance of teaching the structure of the academic disciplines. Indeed, the most widely quoted statement from *The Process of Education* was his assertion, "We start with the bold hypothesis that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (33). The task for curriculum developers and instructional designers was to identify the key elements of an academic discipline, introduce the ideas early in a form that young children could understand, and build on those ideas, allowing them to become more complex as students proceeded through levels of schooling.

Cultivation of Intuition

Bruner and the Woods Hole participants wanted to encourage intuitive thinking by youth. Bruner noted that some people seemed especially capable of reaching powerful conclusions intuitively, on the basis of incomplete data. He believed that schools did a poor job of developing intuition. Acquiring a knowledge about the structure of a discipline might lay the foundation for intuitive thought, but it would not guarantee that students would become intuitive

thinkers. After all, Bruner reasoned, scholars varied in their ability to be creative thinkers.

A popular idea in the 1960s was to teach the "method of inquiry" of the scientist, and a popular goal was to have students think about problems as a scientist does. Although Bruner did not use the phrase "method of inquiry" in the book, his ideas relating to cultivating intuition were employed by others to encourage discovery learning and to promote inquiry methods within each academic field.

Impact on Social Studies Education

Although the Woods Hole conference was mainly concerned with science and mathematics education, Bruner believed that principles associated with the structure of a discipline, readiness to learn, and cultivation of intuition could apply equally well to the social studies. Shortly after *The Process of Education* was published, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Education, and private foundations began funding social studies curriculum development projects that attempted to put Bruner's ideas into practice. Inspired by the Woods Hole experience, the Social Science Education Consortium was established to draw together psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, historians, and educators who might take leadership in advancing the "new social studies." Soon, scholars were commissioned to identify the structure of each of the academic disciplines associated with the field of social studies.

The new social studies peaked in the 1960s and declined thereafter. There were many reasons for its decline: The project materials were more expensive than regular textbooks; many teachers were ill-prepared to teach in the ways prescribed by the projects; the content often deviated from traditional content and attracted criticism from community groups; the project materials were judged too demanding for average and below-average students; and the Vietnam War, racial conflict, and other social problems led away from the academic disciplines to an interest in such topics as ethnic studies and moral education.

Value of *The Process of Education* Today

Many of the ideas and issues treated in *The Process of Education* are as relevant today as they were forty years ago. The field of social studies could once again be stimulated by curriculum projects that attracted the participation of teams of scholars and teachers. The need to design curricula that draw upon the humanities and social sciences seems to be as important today as it was then. Although it would be nonproductive to return to a search for *the* structure of each academic discipline, the social studies curriculum is adrift today. It badly needs some underlying intellectual principles that can provide structure and content coherence across grade levels. Because the problems of social studies instruction have changed little over forty years, the quest for a solution might start with a rereading of *The Process of Education*.

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How We Think

The invitation to consider which books of the twentieth century had, or should have had, the greatest impact on social education presented both a pleasure and a problem. The pleasure is that a variety of books that have had great direct impact on our field spring immediately to mind. The list includes works by authors such as Harold Rugg, Charles Beard, Edgar Wesley, Howard Beale, Merle Curti, Charles Merriam, George Counts, Bessie Pierce, Maurice Hunt and Lawrence Metcalf, Hazel Hertzberg, James Michener, Byron Massialas, Ted Fenton, Don Oliver, James Shaver, Shirley Engle, Hilda Taba, Robert Barr, James Barth, Samuel Shermis, Fred Newmann, Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, Bill Stanley, Cleo Cherryholmes, and of course many others. Other works by philosophers, educationists, historians, economists, sociologists, psychologists, critics, and general intellectuals could also be included for their often more indirect impact on thinking about social education. Uncounted books should have had great impact on our views of society and social education, including ideas from such diverse thinkers as Franz Kafka, Alvin Gouldner, Frances Fitzgerald, Raymond Callahan, Bertrand Russell, Ralph Ellison, Buckminster Fuller, Howard Zinn, R. H. Tawney, and Jeremy Rifkin. The lists are endless; the problem is to identify one book that represents the greatest impact.

In thinking about the relative impact of these books on thinking in social education, I was struck by the impact of John Dewey's slim volume, *How We Think*, in which Dewey attempted to explain processes of thinking and an approach that should undergird classroom practice. Many of Dewey's books—*School and Society*, *Experience and Education*, *Democracy and Education*—could properly be examined as among the most influential. But in *How We Think*, Dewey demonstrated the theory-practice connection for which he was known. The book provides a process for continuing, thoughtful pursuit of knowledge more than it provides merely the products of that pursuit, and it offers a guide for teachers that does not depend on extensive philosophic understanding. Throughout the book, Dewey illustrates a keen interest in bringing rich theoretical ideas to bear on teachers' work, and he credits the experiences of teachers in experimental schools for testing his ideas.

How We Think was first published in 1910, nearly a century ago, and a second edition appeared in 1933. The second edition excised some material from the first, added other material to become about one-third longer and much clearer in prose, and extended its concern from elementary to all teachers. Although

many of the ideas are dated and some of the writing is stilted, the book still provides a rich source for social education. The writing is clear and direct, the illustrations pertinent, the rationale persistent. Not all of Dewey's works can be said to exhibit these traits, no matter what their impact has been.

Dewey was influenced by Hegel and Darwin in his early academic studies and although he drifted from their ideas over time, significant traces of their thinking are in much of his writing. The use of reason, the dynamic condition of life, the linkage of thought to action, and the concept that progress can occur through the use of intelligence rather than reliance on absolutistic or fatalistic answers are basic to Dewey's strong commitment to democracy, his devastating critiques of absolutism and to traditional forms and practices of education, and his active participation in political life. These are elements of progressive education, and progressive education was the spawning ground for contemporary social studies.

How We Think incorporated the Dewey idea that thinking is instrumental in our efforts to control the process of life. It is his explanation of a scientific way of thinking about social problems, with hypotheses, experimentation, and experience as tests, and tentative conclusions. Dewey provided a more direct and substantial connection between democracy and education than do most philosophers, and in Dewey, that connection is the result of the dynamics of intelligence as an influence on social institutions. Experience is reconstructed through thinking. A problem or conflict is recognized because a human interest is unsatisfied; potential solutions are posed and tested by experiment or experience, and a conclusion is developed that can lead to actions toward improvement. As modernism encroached on absolutism, Dewey offered a well-considered means to improve life. In postmodern times and a new millennium, does not reflective thinking retain much of its value for social education? Has not Dewey been rediscovered by the postmodernists? The process of reflective thinking is consistent with democratic education. It offers a pedagogy that links the development of knowledge, criticism, and revision to social progress. It is dynamic and self-renewing.

This book's impact on social education is also shown in the extensive use in social studies literature of the broad orientation and framework for a thinking process that Dewey describes. Whether the term used is reflective thinking (Dewey's preference), critical thinking, inquiry, or higher-order thinking, nearly all significant literature in social studies education incorporates these ideas in examining both purposes of the field and teaching practice. Although there are continuing and energetic arguments in our field over the knowledge base that should drive social education, history, or social studies, few thoughtful critics on any side would claim that reflective or critical thinking should be discarded as a key purpose for the field. The most traditional historicists, if they are scholars, do not argue for history without thought. Social studies advocates are probably unanimous in their support for critical or reflective thinking, arguing that simple memorization is a likely, even if not advocated, outcome of the history-dominated movement. Similarly, the argument between views of social education as citizenship or social criticism does not denigrate critical thinking. Scholars on each side agree that critical thinking is crucial to democratic society and to schooling, and Dewey's reflective thinking is the primary framework for that premise.

Not only do scholars in social education use the ideas in *How We Think* as a touchstone for a thinking process, classroom teachers use those ideas in formulating curriculum and pedagogy. In the United States and many other nations, local schools identify reflective or critical thinking as among the most important of goals for social studies. It is difficult to find a school district social studies curriculum guide, a teacher's guide for social studies classroom materials, or a college-level social studies methods textbook that does not cite such thinking as of prime importance.

One of the measures of influence of an idea is that it becomes virtually invisible, interwoven into the cloth of the community, while giving the community a shape and resilience. *How We Think* fits that niche in social education.

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An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy

The invitation to write a brief essay "on a book that had (or should have had) the greatest impact upon social education in the United States" struck me initially as presenting a formidable task of selection. However, as I mulled over the various works (e.g., John Dewey's *How We Think* and *Democracy and Education*, Reginald Archambault's *John Dewey on Education*, Charles Beard's *The Nature of the Social Sciences*, Charles Silberman's *Crisis in the Classroom*) that I have referred to over the years in talking with groups of social studies educators about the development and explication of sound rationales on which to base curricular and instructional choices, a book quickly emerged as the one upon which I had relied most extensively. Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944) is a classic piece of applied social science that should have had a tremendous impact on social studies education.

What is it about Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* that makes it so potentially valuable in rationale building for social studies? First, from the discerning title, to the observation that "*the American Negro problem [sic] is a problem in the heart of the American. . . .* [a] *moral dilemma of the American*" (p. xlvii, ital-

ics in the original throughout). Myrdal went to the core of public issues in this society. As he noted, the issue of race in America "would be of a different nature. . . if the moral conflict raged only between valuations held by different persons. The essence of the moral situation is, however, that the conflicting valuations are also held by the same person. *The moral struggle goes on within people and not only between them*" (xlvii-xlviii).

Myrdal set the racial moral dilemma in the context of what he called "the American Creed," the fundamental political values of our society:

> These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men [sic], and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's early struggle for independence. . . . [T]hese tenets were written into the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and into the constitutions of the several states. . . [and] have thus become the highest law of the land. (4)

The general ideals that constitute the creed are a "social *ethos*, a political creed that Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds and colors . . . have. . . in common". And then, an affirmation that I have quoted repeatedly: "This American Creed," with its the origins in the enlightenment, Christianity, and English law (6–12), "is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation" (3). Moreover, "that most Americans have most valuations in common, though they are differently arranged and bear different intensity coefficients. . . makes discussion possible" (1029). Attention to the creed as a cohesive force and basis for productive disputation should be an element in any rationale for social studies education.

Although the creed is a conscious part of American society, Myrdal noted, "as principles that ought to rule," it "is not very satisfactorily effectuated in actual social life" (3). Why? Is it that Americans are hypocrites who only pay lip service to fundamental democratic ideals? Myrdal provided in several places support for his rejoinder that "this explanation is too superficial" (21), but especially in his discussion of valuations and beliefs in Appendix 1. Of special significance is Myrdal's elaboration of a point made in his introduction—that the values at the "general plane. . . , the 'American Creed'," conflict with those at the "specific planes of individual and group living" (xlvii), resulting in what appear to be contradictions between belief and behavior but are instead the result of emphasizing one value while the other is kept in the shadow of consciousness.

That analysis is valid, with one major exception: Conflict occurs not only between general and specific values but also between values at the same level of generality, including the basic values in the Creed (Oliver and Shaver 1974, 24). That Myrdal was aware of value discord at the general level is suggested by his discussion of discrepancies between equality of opportunity and liberty/individual choice (573), but that awareness did not surface in his analysis of value conflict.

With recognition of that shortcoming, Myrdal's treatment of values in the context of a basic problem of American democracy is an excellent foundation on which to structure a rationale that takes into account the role of values in personal and societal ethics in this society. If that were all that *An American Dilemma* had to offer, I would commend it to social studies educators. But there is much more.

The major portion of the volume is a sweeping, in-depth description and analysis of the status of black Americans in 1944 and the roots of that status from historical, legal, political, economic, social, and anthropological perspectives. It is a model of thorough social science analysis of a public issue; it is also now of historical value as a poignant survey of the circumstances that are part of the individual and collective memories of black Americans.

An American Dilemma also has significance for social studies educators interested in applied social science epistemology and methodology. In the effort to "ascertain social reality as it is," Myrdal reminds us, it is necessary to remember that "when people define situations as real, they are real" (xlix). Moreover, "to disregard the fact that people are moral beings" threatens "the possibility of. . . true knowledge" (xlix-l). Explicit recognition of the role of values in research, including the researcher's value assumptions, is essential. (For example, Myrdal revealed his belief that "the more general valuations actually represent a 'higher' morality" [1029]). And, "*biases in social science cannot be erased simply by 'keeping to the facts' and by refined methods of statistical treatment of the data*" (1041). Although Myrdal did not eschew numbers, he was, in 1944, no alien to the concerns of today's qualitative educational and social science researchers.

An American Dilemma is a prodigious work, a tour de force of applied social science research, and it is difficult to demonstrate in a brief essay its richness for social studies educators. The length of the book (1,483 pages) should not deter prospective readers, as it is both insightful and readable. Sample it here and there, browsing for topics of interest, and you will be drawn in. To be a classic, a book must be as pertinent today as when it was written. *An American Dilemma* meets that standard.

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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

The effect of an event in the past is always hard to predict. Anyone who has studied history should understand how difficult it is to determine which recent events will have the greatest impact on generations to come. Consequently, selecting the books that have most influenced or should have influenced social educators in this century is a risky venture at best. Nevertheless, one can claim with some confidence that Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970) has been one of the most influential books of this century and likely will continue to be viewed that way by historians in the future. Kuhn's ideas are not always easy to grasp, but I believe his work is directly relevant to social education and worth the effort to understand.

Few books have provoked more discussion and controversy in this century than *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The response to Kuhn's ideas was immediate and has continued for the past thirty-five years. Although most of the controversy concerning Kuhn's book was among intellectuals, the widespread use of the terms "paradigm" and "paradigm shift" in the popular culture gives some indication of the book's more general impact.

Kuhn's critics have accused him of being a radical relativist who promoted subjectivism, irrationalism, and mob psychology while questioning the possibility of objectivity, truth, and scientific knowledge. Ironically, Kuhn's supporters often caused him as much distress as his critics, when they applauded what they took to be his antiscience position. Like John Dewey, Kuhn spent much of his career, until his death in 1994, trying to correct misinterpretations of his work by critics and supporters alike. What was the basis for such strong reactions to Kuhn's work?

The hostility to Kuhn's ideas had several causes. He posed a direct challenge to the assumptions of mainstream (or what he called "normal") science. His original insights regarding the nature of scientific knowledge were profoundly radical, even if, in the face of mounting criticism, he began to back away from some of his more controversial positions. No doubt ambiguity and lack of clarity also contributed to the numerous interpretations and misreadings of his text. For example, he was often confusing and unclear in his use of terms like "paradigm" and "incommensurability." On the one hand, Kuhn had discovered what he believed were powerful constraints on the scientific method and the growth of scientific knowledge. On the other, he remained a strong supporter of mainstream science and did not want to give up his belief in realism or the possibility of scientific progress.

The most sensitive dimension of Kuhn's work is its relation to what Bernstein (1983) calls "Cartesian anxiety": Either there is some fixed foundation for our knowledge (especially scientific knowledge), or we face the intellectual and moral chaos of radical relativism and nihilism. In other words, if we do not have firm foundations for our knowledge, we cannot be certain of knowing anything. This issue has haunted intellectual discussions in the West for much of the last two centuries in the work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Peirce, and Dewey, the debates over positivism in the twentieth century, and more recent disputes in the philosophy of science, science studies, and the current "culture wars." But either/or thinking poses a false dichotomy that distorts our ability to understand the nature of human knowledge, and Kuhn's views can help us understand why.

Kuhn's central ideas first emerged in 1947 as he was taking his doctorate in physics at Harvard. While reading Aristotle's physics, he wondered how someone so brilliant could hold such dubious views of the natural world. In a sudden epiphany, Kuhn realized that Aristotle's conception of nature did make sense if one understood the very different world view (or paradigm) that oriented his thinking. Scholars like Aristotle (or Priestly and Lavosier, Newton and Einstein) literally saw very different worlds. Each of those scientists was working within a different paradigm that both enabled and limited what they understood as data and theory. From the vantage point of the paradigm that shaped his thinking, Aristotle's physics worked quite well.

At first glance, Kuhn's insight might seem no more than a simplistic restatement of historicism, the idea that we must try to understand each historical period in its own terms. But Kuhn's historicism is far more radical and complex than that. Mainstream scientists grant that science has been oriented by very different paradigms in the past, but over time, a paradigm can no longer explain adequately the phenomena it encounters and a rival paradigm emerges that gives a more accurate account of nature. But it was just this prevailing account of the growth of scientific knowledge that Kuhn rejected. Instead, he argued, when confronted with a theory choice involving two different paradigms, there "is no neutral algorithm, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the [rival scientific communities] to the same decision" (Kuhn 1970, 200). In the end, the superiority of one theory over another is a matter of persuasion or conversion, not proof, because, "the participants in a communication breakdown cannot . . . resort to a neutral language which both use in the same way and which is adequate to the statement of both their theories or even both those theories' empirical consequences" (201).

To accept Kuhn's point is to give up the strong realist belief in the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge about reality. Kuhn himself was reluctant to abandon scientific objectivism and tried to salvage a way to ac-

count for the progressive growth of scientific knowledge by arguing that participants in a paradigm debate must, as a minimum, share the same "stimuli" and "neutral apparatus," even if differently programmed (Kuhn 1970, 201). However, the neural apparatuses in question must themselves be subjected to the very same interpretative difficulties (incommensurabilities) that prevent us from proving the superiority of a given paradigm in the first place (Margolis 1993, 80).

Kuhn's critics are wrong to label him as a radical relativist or subjectivist in matters of scientific dispute. A fair-minded reading of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* demonstrates Kuhn's commitment to objective scientific inquiry and rational persuasion. The fact that we cannot prove the superiority of a particular theory does not mean that we cannot provide good reasons for preferring one theory to another. In this regard, there has been much confusion regarding Kuhn's use of the term "incommensurability" to refer to the difficulty faced in the process of theory choice. Karl Popper (1970) accused Kuhn of assuming that scientists representing different paradigms are trapped within conflicting frameworks, with each group unable to communicate with or understand the other's views. To accept that position is to give up on the very possibility or point of scientific dialogue between proponents of different paradigms.

Kuhn, however, was making a very different point. He never denied the possibility of communication and rational debate between rival groups of scientists representing different paradigms. Incommensurability was a feature of scientific debates, not something that prevented meaningful dialogue. Indeed, it is our paradigms that enable us to make sense of the world. The goal is not to give up our paradigms or world views, for without them we could understand nothing. What Kuhn called into question was the understanding, held by mainstream scientists, "that there is (or must be) a single, universal framework for commensuration" (Bernstein 1983, 85). When one looks at the issue this way, it is the proponents of mainstream science who appear to be the ones trapped within a framework, that is, the view that nature has an invariant, universal structure, governed by universal laws that are discoverable via scientific method.

Mainstream science accepts that disagreements about scientific questions are inevitable and that culture often functions to motivate and distort scientific inquiry. But in the end, science transcends culture because nature, combined with scientific inquiry, will correct our mistakes. We know what will count as evidence and what is required to resolve problems of theory choice. This was Popper's view, but it is exactly the position that Kuhn's work helped make untenable.

Kuhn understood that science, like all forms of human thought, has a history. Our past has conditioned us by providing ways of viewing and understanding the world. The process is not static, and although we are shaped by history, we also act to change the course of history itself. We have, however, no way of standing outside of history to see things as they "really are," absent any mediating influences. Thus, our best estimates of reality are just that, posits conditioned by historical context and the limits of human cognition. We can entertain the concept of a scientific mistake and work to improve our knowledge. But such estimates always occur within the constraints of history and the limits of human cognition. We have no way to know for sure if our scientific knowledge is really progressing, except in terms of our current paradigmatic framework. Consequently, we can say that scientific knowledge does evolve away from something but not toward anything in particular.

Kuhn always did a better job of problematizing the nature of human knowledge than explaining how we should go about making theory choices or how scientific practice actually proceeds. But his ability to pose important questions and give us a framework for analysis has been invaluable. And if Kuhn is right about the nature of scientific knowledge, his ideas would apply with equal force to history and the social sciences. Indeed, rather than seeking to emulate the methods of the natural sciences (particularly physics), historians and social scientists should accept the inevitable limits of the interpretive nature of their work, not so much as a liability but as a reflection of how humans actually make sense of the world. As social educators, we can look upon Kuhn as extending and reinforcing the valuable insights raised by Dewey and Peirce more than a century ago. This is a lesson that proponents of basic philosophical foundations for social education have still failed to learn.

NOTE

The original edition of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was published in 1962 by the University of Chicago Press. All references in this article are to the second edition published in 1970 by the University of Chicago Press.

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